From legislative ambiguity to judicial uncertainty: The case for reforming India's law-making process.

The Karnataka High Court, speaking through Justice Anant Ramanath Hegde, raises a fundamental question concerning legislative drafting: Why should courts spend years determining whether an amendment operates prospectively, retrospectively or retroactively when the Legislature itself can expressly settle the question at the time of enactment?

The interpretation of laws is an essential judicial function. However, when the Legislature leaves unanswered a fundamental question concerning the temporal operation of a statutory amendment, the resulting uncertainty frequently becomes a fertile source of litigation. Cases travel from subordinate courts to High Courts and eventually to the Supreme Court, consuming years in determining a question that could have been resolved through a few carefully chosen words in the legislation itself.

This recurring problem has now attracted the attention of the Karnataka High Court.

In Veeresh Savadi v. State of Karnataka and Others, Criminal Petition No. 101083/2026 and connected matters, decided on 7 October 2026, Justice Anant Ramanath Hegde raised an important issue concerning the prospective, retrospective and retroactive operation of legislation and the need for greater clarity in legislative drafting.

The Court's observations go beyond the immediate controversy before it and raise a larger institutional question: Should the Legislature expressly declare, whenever it enacts or amends a law, whether the provision is intended to operate prospectively, retrospectively or retroactively, particularly in relation to pending proceedings?

The question assumes considerable significance in a country where statutory amendments are frequent, judicial proceedings are prolonged and uncertainty concerning the application of amended laws has repeatedly resulted in conflicting judicial decisions.

Karnataka High Court flags a recurring problem

The High Court observed that whenever a law is amended, an express legislative declaration regarding its prospective, retrospective or retroactive operation, including its applicability to pending enquiries, inquiries, investigations and cases, would substantially reduce litigation, avoid delay and improve the administration of justice.

The Court also took note of the enormous number of cases reaching the High Courts and the Supreme Court on questions concerning the temporal operation of laws, as well as the divergent judicial opinions that have emerged.

The Court therefore called upon the Legislature, Law Commissions, jurists, Bar Councils, lawyers, academicians and other stakeholders to engage in meaningful deliberations and evolve an effective solution.

The significance of this observation lies in its recognition that uncertainty in legislative drafting is not merely an academic problem. It has practical consequences for litigants, lawyers, courts and the administration of justice.

When an amendment does not clearly specify its temporal application, courts are compelled to examine legislative intent, statutory context, the nature of the rights involved, the distinction between substantive and procedural provisions and the principles governing retrospectivity.

Different interpretations may emerge. The resulting disputes often continue until the Supreme Court finally settles the law.

By then, several years may have passed.

Amendments affecting taxing statutes and property rights without clarity have caused great hardship and many years of misery

The Hindu Succession Act: Years of uncertainty over daughters' coparcenary rights

One of the most striking illustrations of this problem arose from the amendment to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, through the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005.

The amendment was a landmark reform intended to confer equal coparcenary rights upon daughters in Mitakshara joint Hindu families.

However, the question of its application to daughters born before the amendment, and whether the father was required to be alive on the date of commencement, generated substantial litigation.

In Prakash v. Phulavati (2016) 2 SCC 36, the Supreme Court interpreted the amended provision to mean that the coparcener father and daughter must both have been alive on the date of the amendment for the amended provision to apply.

This interpretation became the governing position but generated further controversy.

In Danamma @ Suman Surpur v. Amar (2018) 3 SCC 343 the Supreme Court adopted an approach that led to uncertainty concerning the earlier interpretation.

Eventually, in Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma, (2020) 9 SCC 1 a three-Judge Bench authoritatively clarified that the daughter's coparcenary right arises by birth and that it is not necessary for the father to have been alive on the date of the amendment. The Court also clarified the treatment of earlier partitions and dispositions under the statutory scheme.

Thus, an amendment enacted in 2005 required authoritative clarification by a larger Bench of the Supreme Court in 2020 — approximately fifteen years later.!

During this period, numerous families were drawn into litigation over the interpretation of a provision intended to confer equal property rights upon daughters.

The question naturally arises: Could much of this litigation have been avoided if Parliament had expressly specified the amendment's application to existing coparcenary rights, past transactions and pending proceedings?

The answer is worthy of serious consideration.

The experience demonstrates that even a socially progressive legislative reform may encounter prolonged difficulties in implementation when its temporal operation is insufficiently articulated.

Karnataka Land Reforms Act: How a few words made a significant difference

Another illuminating example comes from the amendments to Section 79A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961.

Section 79A imposed restrictions on the acquisition of agricultural land by persons whose income from non-agricultural sources exceeded the prescribed statutory ceiling.

Over the years, the Legislature increased this income ceiling.

When the ceiling was increased through the 1991 amendment, the question arose whether the enhanced limit would apply only from the date of amendment or whether it would also govern earlier transactions.

In Vijayakumar Shankarayya Sardar v. State of Karnataka, reported in 1993 (3) Kar. L.J. 411, the Karnataka High Court interpreted the amended provision as having retrospective effect, having regard to the language of Section 79A referring to the commencement of the earlier amendment legislation.

The difficulty arose because the amended income ceiling was incorporated into a provision that already contained language referring to an earlier commencement date.

The Legislature subsequently adopted a clearer approach.

When the income ceiling was increased to ?25 lakh through the Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 2015, the opening words of Section 79A were also amended to refer expressly to the commencement of the 2015 Amendment Act.

In S. Anuradha v. Assistant Commissioner, the Karnataka High Court held that this language made the 2015 amendment prospective, distinguishing the earlier interpretation of the 1991 amendment.

This example illustrates an important principle of legislative drafting.

The addition of a few carefully chosen words can prevent years of litigation over the applicability of an amended law.

Instead of leaving courts to reconstruct legislative intention, the Legislature can communicate that intention expressly.

These developments demonstrate that legislative clarity is neither impracticable nor beyond the drafting competence of the Legislature. It is achievable through careful attention to commencement provisions, transitional arrangements and savings clauses.

Prospective, retrospective and retroactive: Why the distinction matters

Although these expressions are frequently used together, they represent distinct legal concepts.

A prospective law ordinarily governs events and transactions occurring after its commencement.

A retrospective law operates upon past events or transactions and may alter their legal consequences, subject to constitutional and other legal limitations.

A retroactive law may operate from its commencement while taking account of antecedent facts or events to determine rights arising under the new law.

The distinction between retrospectivity and retroactivity was particularly significant in Vineeta Sharma, where the Supreme Court characterised the substituted Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act as retroactive in its operation.

The amendment conferred coparcenary rights from its commencement, but birth, an antecedent event, constituted the foundation of those rights.

The problem becomes more complicated when legislation is silent about pending proceedings.

For instance, if a penal statute is amended while an investigation is pending, should the investigating agency apply the law existing on the date of the alleged offence or the amended provision?

If a civil law is amended during the pendency of an appeal, should the appellate court apply the original law or the amended law?

If a statutory disqualification is relaxed, should the benefit extend to transactions that occurred before the amendment?

These questions cannot always be answered merely by identifying whether the amendment is substantive or procedural.

The nature of the rights affected, the language of the enactment, the existence of vested rights, constitutional limitations and legislative intention may all become relevant.

The courts have developed principles of interpretation to address such difficulties. Yet those principles cannot eliminate every ambiguity left by the Legislature.

It is precisely this recurring uncertainty that the Karnataka High Court's observations seek to address.

Statutory illustrations: A valuable legislative practice deserving revival

There is another dimension to this discussion that merits attention.

Some of India's foundational enactments demonstrate remarkable legislative foresight in their drafting.

The Indian Penal Code, 1860, the Indian Contract Act, 1872, and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, contained statutory illustrations explaining how particular provisions were intended to operate in practical situations.

These illustrations were not mere academic examples. Being incorporated into the legislation, they provided valuable assistance in understanding the scope and application of statutory provisions.

The Indian Contract Act, for instance, continues to contain illustrations explaining legal principles through ordinary commercial and contractual situations.

The advantage of this method is obvious.

Instead of stating an abstract legal proposition and leaving its practical implications entirely to judicial interpretation, the Legislature provides concrete examples demonstrating its intended operation.

This drafting technique does not eliminate every interpretational dispute, but it reduces avoidable ambiguity.

Modern legislation, despite addressing increasingly complex economic, technological and social questions, does not consistently employ this useful technique.

There is considerable merit in reviving and adapting the practice of statutory illustrations, particularly where legislation introduces complex rights, liabilities, exemptions, transitional provisions or legal consequences.

In the context of retrospective and retroactive legislation, statutory illustrations could be especially valuable.

For example, where an amendment changes the eligibility criteria for obtaining a statutory benefit, an illustration could clarify whether a person whose application was filed before the amendment but remains pending is entitled to the benefit.

Similarly, where a disqualification is removed, an illustration could explain whether the removal affects earlier transactions, pending proceedings or only future conduct.

Such legislative guidance would reduce uncertainty at the very stage when disputes ordinarily arise.

The Legislature should not leave everything to judicial interpretation

The judiciary undoubtedly possesses the constitutional responsibility of interpreting legislation.

However, there is an important distinction between interpreting the law and repeatedly resolving ambiguities that could reasonably have been avoided during the legislative process.

The Legislature determines legislative policy. The courts ascertain and apply the law.

Where the Legislature intends an amendment to operate prospectively, retrospectively or retroactively, it is better placed to express that intention directly than to leave courts to infer it through prolonged litigation.

The present system often produces an unfortunate sequence.

An amendment is enacted without sufficient transitional clarity. Different litigants advance competing interpretations. Subordinate courts and tribunals deliver divergent decisions. High Courts are called upon to resolve the controversy. Different Benches may interpret the amendment differently. Eventually, the matter reaches the Supreme Court, sometimes requiring consideration by a larger Bench.

By the time the law is settled, the amendment may have been in operation for several years.

This imposes substantial costs on litigants and adds to the already considerable burden of pending cases.

It may also create uncertainty in property transactions, commercial arrangements, criminal prosecutions, taxation, employment disputes and statutory entitlements.

The administration of justice should not be compelled to bear avoidable consequences of legislative ambiguity.

A practical reform: Mandatory consideration of temporal operation

A meaningful reform would be to introduce a standard legislative drafting requirement under which every Bill proposing to enact, substitute, amend or repeal a statutory provision must expressly consider its temporal operation.

The Legislature should ordinarily address the following questions:

1. Whether the provision operates prospectively, retrospectively or retroactively, and the date from which it takes effect.
2. Whether it applies to transactions, acts, omissions or events occurring before commencement.
3. Whether it applies to pending enquiries, inquiries, investigations, trials, appeals and other proceedings.
4. Whether rights already accrued, liabilities already incurred and proceedings already concluded are preserved or affected.
5. Whether any transitional arrangements, savings clauses or statutory illustrations are necessary to prevent ambiguity.

These matters could be addressed through a dedicated commencement and application clause, supplemented by a schedule or statutory illustrations wherever appropriate.

A model provision might read:

Illustrative legislative drafting clause

“The provisions of this Amendment Act shall operate prospectively with effect from [specified date] and shall apply to acts, transactions and proceedings arising on or after that date. Their application to proceedings pending on the date of commencement and to rights accrued or liabilities incurred before commencement shall be governed by the transitional and savings provisions specified herein.”

Illustrative wording only; the Legislature would need to tailor the clause to the nature and purpose of each enactment.

Where retrospective operation is intended, the legislation should specify the effective date, the extent of retrospectivity and the treatment of concluded and pending proceedings.

Where retroactive operation is intended, the legislation should identify the antecedent facts or events that will be relevant to the operation of the amended law.

Such a requirement need not restrict legislative discretion. It would merely require the Legislature to exercise that discretion expressly.

Equally, temporal clarity must remain subject to constitutional limitations. For instance, Article 20(1) of the Constitution prohibits retrospective criminalisation and the imposition of a greater penalty than that applicable when the offence was committed. A legislative declaration cannot override constitutional protections.

The objective is not to insist that every amendment must operate in a particular manner. It is to ensure that the Legislature consciously determines and clearly communicates how the amendment is intended to operate.

Law Commissions, Bar Councils and legal professionals have an important role

The issue raised by the Karnataka High Court deserves institutional attention.

The Law Commission of India and the State Law Commissions could undertake a comprehensive study of litigation generated by uncertainty concerning the temporal operation of statutory amendments.

Such a study could examine the number of cases reaching constitutional courts, the time taken to resolve conflicting interpretations and the recurring drafting deficiencies that produce such disputes.

Bar Councils, Bar Associations, legal practitioners and academicians can contribute practical experience from litigation.

Legislative drafting authorities could thereafter develop model provisions for commencement, retrospective operation, transitional arrangements, savings clauses and pending proceedings.

There is also merit in considering whether every proposed amendment should be accompanied by an explanatory statement specifically addressing its temporal application.

Such a statement would not necessarily replace clear statutory language. The operative provision itself should ordinarily contain the necessary declaration.

The aim should be to institutionalise clarity rather than leave it to occasional legislative foresight.

Legislative clarity is an essential component of access to justice

The observations of Justice Anant Ramanath Hegde deserve serious consideration because they connect the quality of legislative drafting with the efficiency of the justice delivery system.

The constitutional promise of access to justice cannot be measured only by the availability of courts.

It also requires laws that are sufficiently clear, predictable and capable of consistent application.

When litigants are compelled to spend years discovering whether an amendment applies to their rights or proceedings, the resulting delay is not merely an interpretational inconvenience. It affects the practical enjoyment of legal rights.

The experience under the Hindu Succession Act and the Karnataka Land Reforms Act demonstrates that temporal ambiguity can produce substantial and prolonged litigation.

The revival of statutory illustrations, coupled with express commencement, application and savings provisions, offers a practical means of reducing such disputes.

Of course, no drafting reform can eliminate the need for judicial interpretation. New situations will arise, unforeseen circumstances will emerge and difficult questions of constitutional and statutory construction will continue to require adjudication.

But the inevitability of some litigation cannot justify avoidable ambiguity.

Conclusion: A few words in legislation may save years in court

The Karnataka High Court has identified an issue that deserves attention far beyond the case in which the observations were made.

When the Legislature enacts or amends a law, it should not leave unanswered the fundamental question of when, how and to whom the law applies.

The experience of the Hindu Succession Act demonstrates how uncertainty over the operation of an amendment can require years of judicial clarification.

The amendments to the Karnataka Land Reforms Act demonstrate how express legislative language can make a decisive difference.

The statutory illustrations found in several foundational Indian enactments further demonstrate that legislative drafting can be both precise and explanatory.

A law should not become a source of prolonged litigation merely because the Legislature has failed to specify whether it operates prospectively, retrospectively or retroactively.

The call made by Justice Anant Ramanath Hegde is therefore timely and significant.

The Legislature, Law Commissions, jurists, Bar Councils, legal practitioners, academicians and other stakeholders should seriously consider evolving a uniform legislative drafting framework that expressly addresses the temporal operation of every substantial statutory amendment.

The time has come to recognise that clarity in legislation is not merely a matter of drafting excellence. It is an instrument for reducing litigation, preventing conflicting judicial decisions, protecting legal certainty and improving the administration of justice.

S.Basavaraj

Senior Advocate

Bengaluru